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Abstract 
Early retirement of workers is used by firms as means to rejuvenate their workforces. In 
principle, workers can either simply be laid off or can be offered an early retirement option 
combined with a financial bonus. However, dismissing masses of older workers may be 
detrimental to social peace and stability and damage the firm’s reputation, while entry into 
early retirement with a severance pay at least maintains the semblance of a worker’s voluntary 
decision. Cross-national analyses of this topic using micro data are, however, widely missing. 
Using the SHARE (Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe) data set, this paper 
fills this gap by investigating to what extent institutional factors such as the generosity of the 
pension system and strong unions influence firms’ rejuvenation policies. Stronger unions 
appear to lead to a higher likelihood of receiving a severance pay, as does a more generous 
pension system. In contrast, a higher decrease in wealth accrual leads to a higher probability 
of simple lay-off. It is concluded that the current reforms which aim at lowering the 
replacement rate and employment protection will most probably lead to more dismissals of 
older workers without severance pay. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In times of economic hardship and fierce international competition, it is vital to companies to 
maintain a high level of efficiency in their production. Older workers are, however, generally 
perceived as less productive compared to their younger colleagues, leading to an economic 
incentive to rejuvenate the workforce. Such rejuvenation may become the more urgent the 
stronger a firm is exposed to international competition. Indeed, Fischer and Somogyi (2009) 
show for a panel of OECD countries from 1985 – 2003 that economic globalization lowers the 
employment protection of workers, which they view as a consequence of employers’ lobbying 
activities. In most European countries, however, protection of workers against individual or 
mass dismissals creates a legal obstacle to a simple ‘firing’ policy. Thus, employment 
protection legislation through strong unions might well impact producers’ choice of 
rejuvenation policies (see also Dreher and Gaston, 2007).  
 
Not only strong unions, but also the institutional setting of the old-age pension system may 
have an impact on the means by which producers try to rejuvenate their work forces. A 
generous old-age pension system and early retirement scheme, reducing the income loss 
associated with ceasing work, might ease worker’s decision to leave the firm voluntarily and 
well prior to legal retirement age. Potentially, offering severance pays may then not be 
necessary as additional financial incentives to leave the firm. Instead, the ‘golden handshake’ 
may rather financially compensate for an ungenerous pension system that punishes early 
withdrawals from the labor force. Thus, it is conjectured that the institutional setting of the 
old-age pension system might equally affect firms’ rejuvenation policies.  
  
For these reasons, knowing how institutional determinants affect producers’ rejuvenation 
choices can help understand some potential side-effects of governments’ efforts to reform the 
pension system and to deregulate the labor market. The decision to either fire a worker or to 
offer a severance pay for her voluntary and premature withdrawal is also influenced by a 
variety of additional factors, including not only the employee’s personal and job 
characteristics, but also the general condition of the national economy – which this study 
takes equally into account. In the focus of this analysis, however, are those institutional 
determinants of rejuvenation policies the shape of which is subject to the discretion of policy-
makers.  
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This paper is among the first to analyze the institutional determinants of firms’ rejuvenation 
policies across Europe – in particular whether workers’ early retirement decisions have been 
induced by a severance pay or not. Using a cross-section of microdata of persons aged 50 and 
older in 10 European countries collected in 2005 (SHARE) that contains individual 
employment histories of about 7000 early retirees, it is possible to construct a pseudo-micro 
panel at the individual level and a country panel at the aggregate level, both from 1960 to 
2004. At the individual level, a rich set of personal and job-related characteristics is included. 
The panel structure at the aggregate level allows exploiting the variation of macroeconomic 
and institutional factors both over time and across countries, making it possible to account for 
unobserved country heterogeneity and to draw convincing policy conclusions.1  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the theoretical (and 
empirical) context of how labor market institutions determine a firm’s rejuvenation policy, 
while section 3 describes the micro data and the institutional measures. Section 4 introduces 
the empirical model, while section 5 presents the empirical results. The paper concludes with 
some policy recommendations. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Context and Own Contribution 
 
2.1 Theoretical Context and Hypotheses 
Prior to empirically analyzing the institutional factors that influence employer’s choice 
between two alternative rejuvenation policies, some theoretical arguments need to be 
discussed. From an economist’s perspective, this paper focuses on the demand side of the 
labor market, namely the employer’s choice of either offering a severance pay to induce 
voluntary retirement or exercising a simple lay-off policy. Most past empirical studies on the 
causes of early retirement have emphasized the labor-supply-side aspect (e.g. Blöndal and 
Scarpetta, 1999; Duval, 2003), namely the economic incentives for workers to retire early. 
Only a few empirical contributions deal with the demand-side aspect of early retirement, 
based on the ground-laying theoretical work of Lazear (1986), and none of them investigates 
the firm’s choice between alternative rejuvenation policies.  
 
 
                                               
1
 The importance of accounting for unobserved country heterogeneity for obtaining unbiased results is shown in 
e.g. Fischer (2010).  
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Demand-side arguments 
The old-age pensions system might play the role of an unemployment insurance and 
‘subsidize’ the company’s own costs of financing premature retirement. Building on this 
view, Hutchens’ model (1999) predicts that more firms send their older workers into early 
retirement when social security and pension system benefits are generous. Indeed, several 
cross-country studies are in support of this view: Duval (2003) finds in OECD countries more 
generous early retirement routes negatively associated with male labor force participation 
rates, while Fischer and Sousa-Poza (2009b) show for 10 European countries that a more 
generous and actuarially neutral ordinary old-age pension system increase the probability of 
early retirement2. Analogous results were obtained in various country-specific studies using 
individual data (for an overview, see Gruber and Wiese 2002).3 All these studies, however, do 
not distinguish between different types of early retirement, in particular that with severance 
pay from that without it. More generous early retirement systems make it financially attractive 
for workers to retire early – consequently, they are more likely to accept their premature 
dismissal. Thus, fewer companies can be expected to offer older workers an early retirement 
with severance pay as opposed to a prematurely fire them when the national pension system is 
generous. Consequently, it can be stated: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
A generous pension system lowers the probability of retiring early with severance pay.   
 
 
The protection of the labor force through strong unions against dismissals or downward 
adjustments of wages might equally impact firms’ retirement policies. Blöndal and Scarpetta 
(1999) argue that a higher degree of employment protection leads to stronger labor market 
rigidities making the realization of age-adjusted wage schemes more difficult. Consequently, a 
stricter protection of older workers against such adjustments reinforces the incentive for 
employers to rejuvenate their workforce. In this light, stronger unions trigger a higher need for 
producers to send their older workers into early retirement. However, a simple lay-off policy 
                                               
2
 These findings are corroborated by similar cross-national analyses of labor market participation rates of the 
older population - for men, see Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) and Johnson (2000); for women, see Johnson 
(2001). For a correlation analysis based on 11 industrialized countries, see Gruber and Wise (1998). 
3
 Even though the effect the pension accrual rate on labor supply is in economic theory ambiguous (Mitchell and 
Fields, 1984, Lazear, 1986), the empirical evidence is – up to now – clear-cut.  
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is equally prevented by stronger unions, which leaves the firms with the sole option to 
‘induce’ workers to choose early retirement schemes.4  
In this context, Wasmer (2006) conjectures that in countries with strong employment 
protection managers who wish to rejuvenate their work force choose harassments and other 
forms of working environment deterioration to lower workers’ job satisfaction, in order to 
make them quit their jobs ‘voluntarily’. Indeed, in an empirical micro analysis on well-being 
of Canadian workers he shows that stronger employment protection, which varies across 
Canadian provinces, leads to more stress among workers and other forms of mental ill-being. 
That job satisfaction is a driver of workers’ health has also been shown by Fischer and Sousa-
Poza (2008, 2009a) for both the German Household Panel as well as for a European cross-
section of micro data (SHARE 2005).5 In case a firm chooses the ‘harassment’-strategy to 
overcome strong employment protection laws, it is not necessary to use additional financial 
incentives. Thus, one may hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Strong unions lower the probability of retiring early with severance pay. 
 
 
However, strong unions may well protect workers against harassment and working 
environment deterioration. In that case, producers’ only means to rejuvenate their workforce 
is to induce early retirement by offering costly a ‘severance pay’ to the worker, which she 
might accept or not. Supporting evidence for this hypothesis might be the cross-country study 
by Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) that found that union density increases the labor market 
participation of older workers, potentially reflecting the larger wage bargaining power of 
unions, leading to more favorable labor market conditions for older workers. However, up to 
now there is a research void on the effects of employment protection on the probability of 
retiring early with severance pay as opposed to being laid off. Thus, one may also conjecture:  
 
Hypothesis 3 
Strong unions increase the probability of retiring early with a severance pay. 
                                               
4
 According to the authors, this is particularly the case in the presence of adverse demand shocks which reduces 
the number of firms willing to offer positions to older workers. In that case, workers prefer retiring early over 
staying unemployed. 
5
 A positive association of labor protection legislation with the probability of an employee assessing her 
premature withdrawal as ‘involuntary’ as opposed to ‘voluntary’ is reported in Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2007). 
However, in this study 'involuntary' refers to a situation with general re-employment constraints rather than to 
employer’s behavior. 
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Supply-side arguments 
Turning briefly to the supply side in the labor market, from the worker’s perspective both 
employment protection and pension-system generosity might equally influence their decision 
whether to depart early or not: A generous welfare and pension system might make it 
financially more attractive to ‘retire’ early instead of continuing work (Duval, 2003). Indeed, 
international empirical studies with country panels found that more generous unemployment 
or social security benefits cause a lower labor force participation rate of older males (Duval 
2003; Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999). With more generous pension systems one will probably 
observe less early retirements with severance pay, as in such systems the income loss caused 
by an early retirement is only moderate. Thus, the conjecture from the supply-side perspective 
is equivalent to Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (repeated) 
Generous pension systems decrease the probability of retiring early with severance pay. 
 
 
From a supply-side point of view, stronger unions and employment protection create obstacles 
against forced early retirement through simple lay-off. However, strong unions may also 
cause wage rigidities that decreases re-employment opportunities of older workers (Johnson 
2000; Duval 2003). In such case, it is rational for workers to retire prematurely only if 
substantial severance pays are made. Thus, the supply-side perspective also supports 
Hypothesis 3: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (repeated) 
Strong unions increase the probability of retiring early with severance pay. 
 
 
 
3. Data 
 
To investigate into the institutional determinants of early retirement decisions, the 
(conditional) probability of early retirement with severance pay is viewed as a function of a 
country’s contemporaneous macroeconomic situation and institutional setting, as well as of 
worker’s personal and job characteristics at the same time.  
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3.1. The SHARE Data on Early Retirement 
In this study, the 2005 cross-sectional SHARE data is employed, drawn from a random 
sampling of 22,000 persons over 50 years of age in 10 European countries (Austria, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). Following 
OECD (1995), a retired person is defined as follows: a person who (1) self-assesses her 
employment status as retired and (2) who is factually out of the labor force. This means that 
the person (2a) reports to have ‘ever done paid work’ and (2b) is able to indicate the year 
when she terminated her last job. About half the respondents (about 10,000 persons) assess 
their current job situation as ‘being retired’.6 The reader should note that this definition of 
retirement is not based on objective criteria such as the receipt of old-age pension payments, 
and thus excludes self-reported unemployed, housekeeping and disabled persons from the 
‘retired’.7 The 2005 SHARE data records recall information on respondents’ social and 
economic situation at the time of their retirement decisions, namely gender, marital status, 
year of retirement, level of education (6 categories), type of employment (4 categories), 
hierarchical position in the firm (6 categories), tenure, and firm size (7 categories). 
 
For this analysis the sample of early retirees is drawn in the following way: The data do not 
directly identify those who have retired early. Information, however, is available on the final 
year of the interviewee’s employment. An early retiree is defined as a retired person who 
withdrew from the active labor force before she reached her legal age of pension payment 
eligibility. The SHARE information on individual employment histories allows the 
calculation of the respondent’s age at the year of her retirement. Data on the general legal 
regular retirement age in the 10 SHARE countries from 1960 on, differentiated by gender, 
was obtained from Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) and Duval (2003), replicated in Table A1 of 
the Appendix.8 The analysis is restricted to those who have been in dependent employment in 
their last job, excluding those who were self-employed: Only dependently employed are, in 
principle, eligible to early retirement with severance pay.  
 
                                               
6
 Alternative occupational status categories include being ‘unemployed’, ‘(self-)employed’, ‘permanently sick or 
disabled’, ‘being a homemaker’ or ‘other current job situation’.  
7
 Alternative definitions focus on the receipt of pension payments, irrespective of employment status, or on those 
persons out of the labor force, that is including also the disabled and housewives (see OECD 1995). This 
definition follows the approach in Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2007).  
8
 This definition of legal retirement age does not differentiate by type of job or industrial sector.  
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Of the 9,000 retirees in the SHARE dataset, 1500 were self-employed in their last job. There 
are approximately 6000 dependently employed who retired early (past the age of 48).9 
Roughly 3600 of them are male, while 2400 are female, possibly reflecting lower female 
participation rates in those age groups. The age at the time of early retirement ranges from 49 
to 66, with a mean of 58 life years (median: 59 years) and a standard deviation of four years. 
Graph 1 displays the distribution of the individual’s retirement age in the sample of early 
retirees; obviously, there is a strong tendency to retire at the age of 60, the age at which in 
many countries early retirement benefits become first available (Gruber and Wise, 1998). 
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Graph 1: Distribution of Retirement Age of Early Retirees 
 
Table 1 describes the distribution of the year of retirement in the sample of previously 
dependently employed, but now early retired workers, to whom the institutional and 
macroeconomic variables in the empirical analysis refer. The year of retirement ranges from 
the minimum of 1960 up to the maximum of 2004. The average retirement year is 1992, with 
a standard deviation of roughly 7 years, and the median is 1994, which indicates a distribution 
slightly skewed to the left. Graph 2 displays the distribution of the year of early retirement in 
                                               
9
 In principle, this definition of early retirement as premature departure from the active labor force includes also 
young women who ceased work in order to take care of their children. To avoid their inclusion, we restrict the 
sample to premature departure of workers aged 49 years or older. 
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the sample. Possibly due to natural selection out of the sample through death, only a few cases 
of early retirement are observable during the 1960ies. 
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Graph 2: Distribution of Retirement Year of Early Retirees 
 
However, even though individual retirement decisions took place in different years 
between 1960 and 2004, each person with her specific employment history is observed only 
once. Thus, the SHARE data, a cross-section of presently retired persons older than 50 years 
in 2004, gives rise to repeated, but unbalanced annual cross-sections of individual’s past early 
retirement decisions from 1960 to 2004 - a so-called pseudo-panel. However, at the country 
level, to which the institutional variables of interest refer, a common time-series cross-section 
of early retirement country-years is obtained, equally covering the years 1960 to 2004.  
 
 
3.2. Reasons for Early Retirement  
In the SHARE data, all persons assessing their employment status as ‘retired’ (and 
consequently all ‘early retired’) had to state the main reason for their retirement. The 11 
possible causes range from those related to family situation, health problems, up to legal 
eligibility to pension payments and early retirement benefits. Table 1 presents an overview of 
the 11 causes for early retirement. 
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    Table 1: Causes for Early Retirement across Europe 
Causes 
Cause  
number Percentage 
Became eligible for public pension 1 39.47% 
Became eligible for private occupational 
pension 2 9.97% 
Became eligible for a private pension 3 2.37% 
Was offered an early retirement option (with 
special financial bonus) 4 19.59% 
Was made redundant (for financial reasons) 5 8.81% 
Own ill health 6 19.95% 
Ill health of relative or friend 7 1.74% 
To retire at same time as spouse or partner 8 2.16% 
To spend more time with family 9 3.97% 
To enjoy life 10 6.01% 
Other reason for retirement 11 3.25% 
 
 
In this study, the two causes of interest is early retirement with severance pay (cause number 
4, “firms offered early retirement option with a special financial bonus”) as opposed to early 
retirement caused by lay-off (cause number 5, “firms made retiree redundant”). Table 1 
clearly shows the importance of company-induced early retirement decisions: Among the 
early retirees, more than 28% linked their premature departure to an employer-related cause 
and not to institutional (pension system) or personal reasons (health, family). Only about 9% 
claim that they have been made redundant by their employers. Altogether, about 1600 
interviewees, roughly 30% of all early retirees, state a company-related reason of their early 
retirement decisions: about 1130 persons state to have been offered a severance pay, while 
about 500 claim that they had been laid off by their employers.  
 
Graph 3 gives an illustration of the shares of company-driven retirement decisions averaged 
over the observational period 1960 - 2004, based on the values of Table 1. The share of those 
having been made redundant is depicted in the upper column in dark red, while the share of 
those having received severance pay is symbolized by the lower blue column. The small table 
in Graph 3 presents rounded percentages. Considerable variation across countries is observed.  
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Graph 3: Redundancy vs. Severance Pay (in %) in 10 European Countries, 1960 - 2004 
 
 
3.3. Pension System Characteristics 
The institutional factors of interest are the characteristics of the pension system and the degree 
of employment protection, approximated by union density. Thus, these variables of interest do 
not only vary across countries but also over time, and are matched individually with each 
respondent’s retirement year. As institutional factor that describes the pension system at the 
time of early retirement we employ the (1) ‘average gross replacement rate’ and (2) the 
‘decrease in pension wealth accrual’, also called the ‘implicit tax’ on continuing work, 
obtained from Duval (2003) and Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999), respectively. The ‘average 
gross replacement rate’ variable (Duval 2003) measures the dimension of pension system 
generosity, as it reflects the rate by which the last gross wage is translated into pension 
benefits, expected for the next 5 years by a potential retiree at the age 60, when retiring 
according to the regular retirement pension system. The ‘decrease in pension wealth accrual’ 
attempts to measure the phenomenon that the continuation of work beyond a certain age is 
‘punished’ by a relative decline in future net pension income (Gruber and Wise 1998). The 
‘decrease in pension wealth accrual’ is obtained from Bloendal and Scarpetta (1999) and 
measured as the cumulated decrease in pension wealth accruals (expressed in absolute terms) 
when a single with an average wage postpones her retirement from 55 to 65 years of age in a 
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specific year. It is measured at two points in time only, 1967 and 1995, so that missing values 
have to be linearly interpolated. A pension system is neutral in terms of pension wealth 
accruals if this ‘implicit tax on continuing work’ is zero, - thus, when it neither creates 
incentives to work beyond the regular retirement date nor to retire prematurely. Table 2 
presents an overview of these pension system characteristics, while detailed definitions are 
presented in Table A3 of the Appendix, and descriptive statistics in Table A4.10 
 
 
Table 2: Definition of Pension System Generosity Variables 
Average replacement rate 
Expected gross replacement rate (over the next 5 years) at age 60 in 
regular retirement pension system, by which the last gross wage is 
translated into pension benefits. Data made available by courtesy of 
Mr. Duval, OECD (Duval, 2003). For Denmark and Greece, this 
information was unavailable. Values range from 0% to 80%. 
Decrease in wealth accrual  
Cumulated decrease in pension wealth accruals in year of retirement 
through postponing retirement from 55 to 65 years of age. Obtained 
from Table III.6, Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999), p. 65. For Greece and 
Spain, this information was (partly) unavailable.  
Values range from -0.2 to 7.9 
Notes: Excerpt of Table A3 of the Appendix. 
 
 
3.4. Unions and Protection of Employment 
In this analysis, a measure of union density is used that approximates workers’ protection 
against (unjustified) dismissals and harassment.11 Union density measures the extent of union 
membership in the national labor force (in percentage). Data on union density is available for 
the countries in the SHARE data from the Economic Outlook 2004, chapter 3 (OECD 2004). 
This variable is available for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000; through interpolating the missing 
values, ‘union density’ covers the years 1980 to 2004. In all countries in the SHARE data, 
contracts negotiated with unions are also applied to non-union workers, sometimes stipulated 
in administrative regulations, but equally on a voluntary basis. Consequently, the coverage of 
union contracts exceeds the number of union members by far. As OECD 2004 shows, union 
coverage has been fairly stable over time, while union density has been quite volatile (see 
Table 3). In the context of this analysis, union density is to be viewed as measure of unions’ 
                                               
10
 Unfortunately, no sufficiently long time-series data on the generosity of early retirement schemes are 
available. However, it is a common observation that pension systems that are generous toward regular retirees 
are also generous toward early retirees.  
11
 We abstained from using the index of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), provided by OECD (2004), 
as it ranges from 1985 to 2003 only and is not available for some countries in the SHARE data. See Dreher and 
Gaston (2007) and Fischer and Somogyi (2009) for an application. 
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bargaining power in negotiations with employer (organizations), and, thus, the strength of 
employment protection. 
 
In the countries that form the SHARE data (mostly Western Europe), unions constitute the 
most important wage-setting organization, shaping their labor markets institutions (e.g. 
Bloendal and Scarpetta 1999). For these reasons, many empirical studies employ union 
density as measure of unions’ wage bargaining power, approximating employment protection; 
in international trade contexts, union density is also often used to approximate workers’ wage 
gap (for examples, see Dreher and Gaston 2007; Fischer and Somogyi 2009). In this sample, 
union density (in percentages) ranges from 7% to 80%, with a mean of 36%, and a standard 
deviation of 23%. Table 3 provides an overview of the development of union density in the 10 
SHARE countries, while Table A3 presents its exact definition. In general, trade union density 
has been continuously declining in the last two decades – with the exception of Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, where it remained unchanged. These are the countries in 
which unemployment benefits are administered by unions and their affiliated institutions 
(‘Ghent system’). This heterogeneity in union density development over time is accounted for 
by estimating models that exclude union density as determinant. See Table A4 of the 
Appendix for descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Table 3: Trade Union Density 1980 - 2000 
Trade Union Density 1980 - 2000 
 Trade Union density (in %) 
Country 1980 1990 2000 
Austria 57 47 37 
Denmark 79 75 74 
France 18 10 10 
Germany 35 31 25 
Greece 39 32 27 
Italy 50 39 35 
Netherlands 35 25 23 
Spain 7 11 15 
Sweden 80 80 79 
Switzerland 31 24 18 
Source: OECD 2004, Table 3.3, p. 145 
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3.5. Control Variables 
 
Condition of the Economy 
Country controls also include those macroeconomic factors that may be correlated with the 
institutional variables of interest. For example, richer countries may afford a more generous 
pension system and stronger employment protection, while high unemployment rates may 
create incentives for politicians to raise the implicit tax on continuing work to combat general 
unemployment by rejuvenating the work force at the aggregate level. In the early retirement 
literature, unemployment is often viewed as an important determinant as it may create a 
disincentive for older workers to seek employment after they have been laid off, rather 
choosing the early retirement route (e.g. Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999; Walker 1985; see also 
Fischer and Sousa-Poza, 2009a, for a discussion). The unemployment rate, obtained from the 
OECD, is included in some models to account for a country’s general economic condition.12 
See Table A3 in the Appendix for variable definitions and sources, and Table A4 for 
descriptive statistics. 
 
Person-specific controls 
Worker’s socio-demographic and workplace-related characteristics are measured at the year 
of her retirement, including gender, marital status, education, age, tenure with current 
employer, size of firm, supervisory power, and industrial sector (public administration, state-
owned industry, private industry), all obtained from the SHARE data. The SHARE data do 
not include information on the last wage or respondent’s health status prior to early 
retirement. 13 Descriptive statistics and variable definitions are presented in Tables A2 and A4 
of the Appendix.  
 
 
4. Model and Methodology 
 
This paper investigates the institutional determinants of two alternative modes of retiring 
early (assuming that at an unobserved earlier stage the decision to retire early has already been 
made). The empirical model views the probability of retiring early with severance pay (as 
opposed to being simply laid off) of individual i in country s, P(yis ret_year = 1|xis ret_year), as a 
                                               
12
 In the regression samples, GDP and unemployment rate show a considerable correlation between -0.5 and -0.7. 
See also footnote 10. 
13
 For the importance of earnings for early retirement behavior in the US, see Peracchi and Welch (1994).  
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function of contemporaneous institutional factors (vector zs ret_year ) in country s and 
individual characteristics xis ret_year . All dependent and explanatory variables are observed 
only once, namely in worker’s actual retirement year ret_year. This function is estimated as a 
standard Logit model, in which the dependent variable takes on the value ‘1’ if the retired 
person i departed prematurely with severance pay, and ‘0’ if she was simply made redundant 
by her employer.  
 
Pis ret_year (yis ret_year = 1|xis ret_year) = Λ(α + β xis ret_year  +  γ zs ret_year  + εis ret_year)               (1) 
 
Vector xis ret_year contains socio-demographic and workplace-related characteristics of the 
retiree at the year of her retirement, including gender, marital status, education, age, tenure 
with current employer, size of firm, the degree of supervisory power, and industrial sector 
(public administration, state-owned industry, or private industry). The vector of country 
controls, zs ret_year , includes the set of institutional variables of interest in country s at the year 
of retirement ret_year, namely union density, generosity of the pension system, and the 
implicit tax on continuing work. As macroeconomic controlling factor the unemployment rate 
is added, equally measured at the time of retirement.14 Thus, at the country level, with a 
variation of individuals’ years of retirement from 1960 to 2004 in 10 European countries, the 
classic panel structure of institutional and macroeconomic variables is given that can be 
exploited in the usual fashion. An individual-specific error term εis ret_year completes the 
model. Clustering at the country-year level ensures that standard errors are corrected for 
within-group correlation and robust to heteroscedasticity (Moulton 1990). In other words, the 
Moulton procedure corrects the calculated standard errors of the macro-estimates for the fact 
that institutions vary only across countries and years, but are identical for all individuals of the 
same country who retire in one specific year.15 Λ denotes the logistic cumulative distribution 
function.16 This model is estimated with a Logit estimation - intuitively, the Logit model 
chooses the coefficient vectors α, β and γ to fit the best possible curve to the data given this 
functional form.  
 
The baseline model simply pools the available individual- and country-level data, 
disregarding the pseudo-panel structure at the micro level and the panel structure at the macro 
                                               
14
 A preliminary analysis (available on request) suggests that GDP per capita is never significant and too highly 
correlated with the unemployment rate to be included in the model. 
15
 When clustering one assumes that the number of clusters approaches infinity. The country-year level clusters 
comprise all individuals with identical retirement year in the same country, yielding up to 200 clusters.  
16
 The logistic distribution is similar to a normal distribution except for that its tails are ‘fat’.  
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level (‘pooled’). The second model adds country fixed effects and time fixed effects. Country 
fixed effects take account of time-invariant, but unobserved heterogeneity across countries, 
such as e.g. cultural traits, people’s response behavior, and political institutions, the omission 
of which might bias the coefficient vectors α, β, and γ.17 Time fixed effects take account of 
common macro-economic and political circumstances shared by all countries in the sample at 
the same point in time, such as e.g. the world-wide economic business cycles, financial 
market crises, terrorist attacks, etc. In the third and fourth model variants, the robustness of 
the findings is tested to assuming (1) a time trend variable (in place of the time fixed effects) 
and (2) country-specific time trends that allow for heterogeneity in the unobservable 
macroeconomic and institutional development. 
 
Previous cross-national studies focus on the institutional determinants of early retirement in a 
more general sense, not differentiating between the different reasons for early retirement, or 
even between several types of company-induced withdrawals. Most of them employ country-
level data on labor force participation rates, making their results potentially biased due to 
endogeneity18 and ecological fallacy19. Their approach also restricts the number of controlling 
variables to ensure a sufficiently large degree of freedom in the regressions (e.g. Duval 2003; 
Johnson 2000, 2001; Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999). In contrast, in this study micro data on 
individual decision-making is combined with country-level circumstantial factors, avoiding 
the ecological fallacy problem regarding the micro-determinants, and mitigating the 
endogeneity problem with respect to the institutional and macro-economic factors.  
 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Individual Determinants of Early Retirement 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the individual and work-place characteristics at the 
time of retirement of individual i for the probability of retiring with severance pay as opposed 
to being made redundant prematurely. Column 1 presents the pooled model, while columns 2 
to 4 take into account the panel structure at the country level in various forms: all models 
                                               
17
 For a discussion and an example, see Fischer (2010). 
18
 For discussion, see, e.g. Johnson (2001), Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999). 
19
 The ‚ecological fallacy’ alludes to the fact that the analysis of individual decision-making at an aggregate level 
might produce reversed associations. See Robinson (1950) for a famous example.  
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include country fixed effects. In addition, the model in column 2 adds time fixed effects, the 
one in column 3 employs a joint time trend, while the one in column 4 includes country-
specific time trends. The increase in the Pseudo R2 as goodness of fit measure between 
columns 1 and 2 suggests that country and time fixed effects should not be omitted from the 
final specification. Overall, Table 4 suggests that the early retirement impact of person-
specific determinants are rather robust to whether and how the panel structure at the country 
level is accounted for.  
 
Only a few of the tested person- and workplace-specific factors appear to influence the 
probability of retirement with severance pay, as statistically significant coefficient estimates 
indicate. This probability increases in tenure, on the one hand, and the worker’s age at the 
year of retirement, on the other. Clearly, the older a worker is, the less costly it is for the 
employer to pay the loss-in-earnings-compensating severance pay to induce her early 
retirement. Further, the longer a worker stays with a firm (tenure), the better networked she is, 
and the stronger she is protected by unions and employment protection laws, both preventing 
her lay-off. The significant effect of ‘post-secondary education’ appears to be driven by 
employees in three countries only and should be taken with caution (reference category: ‘no 
education’). 
 
Employees with an important supervisory position are also more likely to retire early with a 
‘golden handshake’, as opposed to being simply dismissed by their employers, (between 25 
and 199 supervisees, reference category ‘no supervision’). Also those who are employed by 
larger firms (firm size > 500 employees) have equally a higher probability of retiring with a 
severance pay, as one would expect (reference category is ‘firm size less than 5 persons’). On 
the one hand, the financial burden of severance pay is more easily borne by larger firms 
(implying larger revenue, market power, and profit). On the other hand, employees in 
management positions often have negotiated special work contracts that stipulate the option of 
premature departure with a ‘golden handshake’. Finally, persons employed by the government 
or in state-owned industries are more likely to depart early with a severance pay, as compared 
to their colleagues who work in the private industry (reference group). Possibly, workers in 
the public sector enjoy special protection through unions, or they profit from special 
employment regulations that apply to the government sector only. 
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Not relevant to the type of company-induced early retirement appears to be gender - when 
controlling for retirement age, – otherwise men are more likely to retire with a severance pay. 
Put differently, working until old age pays off in terms of severance pay, and male employees 
are more likely to do that than women. Also irrelevant appears to be education, defined by the 
OECD ISCED 1997 scale, having controlled separately for respondent’s supervisory position, 
tenure, and gender. Having a small supervisory power exerts an insignificant effect as does 
being a single, solitaire worker. The insignificance of having supervisory power over more 
than 200 persons (as opposed to those who supervised 25 to 199 persons) is possibly driven 
by the rather low number of observations in this category. The effects of small and medium 
firm sizes are rather inconsistent, and, in tendency, rather insignificant. Finally, being married 
appears not to be of relevance for the probability of early retirement with severance pay.  
 
With the focus of this analysis on the institutions that determine the means by which 
companies trigger early retirement, from now on results for person- and workplace-specific 
determinants will not be reported any more, even though they are kept as controls in all 
empirical models that follow. As Table 4 suggests, the individual determinants are rather 
insensitive to how time effects are accounted for. From now on, consistently country and time 
fixed effects will be included throughout.  
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Table 4: Individual Determinants of Early Retirement with Severance Pay 
 1 2 3 4 
female -0.231 -0.327 -0.326 -0.350* 
 [1.29] [1.57] [1.64] [1.73] 
married -0.138 -0.154 -0.130 -0.158 
 [1.02] [1.03] [0.88] [1.06] 
Log (age of retirement) 8.267*** 5.883*** 5.740*** 5.821*** 
 [7.43] [4.32] [4.34] [4.34] 
Primary School 0.240 -0.029 0.028 -0.008 
 [0.72] [0.06] [0.06] [0.02] 
Secondary I 0.251 -0.169 -0.124 -0.115 
 [0.70] [0.36] [0.27] [0.26] 
Secondary II 0.391 0.088 0.114 0.112 
 [1.11] [0.18] [0.24] [0.24] 
Post Secondary 2.582** 2.183* 2.191* 1.979* 
 [2.39] [1.88] [1.91] [1.84] 
Tertiary I or II 0.301 -0.080 -0.016 0.030 
 [0.77] [0.15] [0.03] [0.06] 
Tenure (years) 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
 [4.72] [5.74] [5.66] [5.72] 
Firm size  6 – 15 0.531** 0.433 0.458 0.509* 
 [2.11] [1.55] [1.64] [1.77] 
Firm size 16 – 24 0.405 0.502 0.406 0.433 
 [1.43] [1.51] [1.32] [1.38] 
Firm size 25 – 199 0.527** 0.445 0.466* 0.482* 
 [2.14] [1.63] [1.76] [1.79] 
Firm size 200 – 499 0.482 0.433 0.436 0.426 
 [1.64] [1.36] [1.40] [1.36] 
Firm size > 500 0.843*** 0.914*** 0.840*** 0.868*** 
 [3.18] [3.16] [2.95] [3.00] 
Supervision 1 – 5 persons 0.248 0.020 0.015 0.028 
 [1.10] [0.09] [0.06] [0.12] 
Supervision 6 – 15 persons 0.350 0.172 0.126 0.103 
 [1.46] [0.67] [0.50] [0.39] 
Supervision 16 – 24 persons 0.175 0.002 0.015 0.105 
 [0.52] [0.01] [0.05] [0.31] 
Supervision 25 – 199 persons 0.894*** 0.726** 0.671** 0.663** 
 [2.81] [2.13] [2.04] [2.05] 
Supervision > 200 persons 0.393 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
 [0.80] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
State industry 0.593*** 0.483*** 0.479*** 0.465*** 
 [3.61] [2.81] [2.86] [2.61] 
Civil servant 1.232*** 0.917*** 0.976*** 1.108*** 
 [3.86] [2.74] [3.19] [3.43] 
Country FE no yes yes yes 
Time structure no FE Overall time trend Country-specific trends 
Observations 1437 1436 1437 1437 
Pseudo R2 0.1305 0.2238 0.1968 0.2182 
Clusters 210 209 210 210 
Notes: Dependent variable: Probability of retiring early accompanied by a severance pay, as opposed to being 
simply laid off by the employer. Logit estimation with standard errors clustered at the country-year level. ‘*’, 
‘**’, ‘***’ denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Reference person is male, 
unmarried, with no completed primary school education, working in the private sector, in a small firm (1 – 5 
persons), with no supervisory power (0 persons).  
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5.2. Institutional Factors 
 
Table 5 displays the correlation matrix for the institutional determinants, the significance 
levels and the number of observations on which these correlations are based. Obviously, more 
generous pension systems (measured by the replacement rate) are also less actuarially neutral, 
thus ‘punishing’ continuing work until the legal retirement age (ρ = 0.21). On the other hand, 
stronger unions appear to go parallel with an actuarially less neutral pension system  
(ρ = 0.12). Thus, in tendency, in countries with stronger unions workers are shielded against 
premature und unfair dismissals, while the pension system sets contrasting economic 
incentives to stop work prematurely. This is counteracted by the pension system generosity in 
terms of replacement rate which correlates negatively with union density (ρ = -0.10). Due to 
missing observations for some institutional variables, regression sample sizes depend on 
which institutional variables are included in the model; later various combinations of these 
institutional variables of interest are tested.  
 
Table 5: Correlation of Institutional Variables  
 
Replacement rate  
(at age 60) 
Decrease in  
wealth accrual Union Density 
    
Replacement rate 1   
Significance level -   
Obs. 1372   
    
Decrease in wealth accrual 0.2135 1  
Significance level 0.0000 -  
Obs. 1293 1361  
    
Union density -0.1019 0.1214    1 
Significance level 0.0002 0.0000 - 
Obs. 1344 1335 1408 
 
 
Table 6 displays the results when the institutional factors and the unemployment rate are 
included in the baseline model of Table 4. All models control for person-specific 
determinants, country and time fixed effects (as in Table 4, not reported). The institutional and 
macroeconomic factors are added in a step-by-step procedure. Model 1 augments the baseline 
model with the measure of union strength, while models 2 and 3 add the pension system 
variables. Models 4 and 5 test the sensitivity of previous estimates to the inclusion of the 
unemployment rate. Models 6 and 7 present results when pension system factors are included 
only, thus omitting the macroeconomic control and union density.  
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Turning to the empirical findings, throughout all models 1 to 5, a higher union density appears 
to lead to a higher probability of early retirement with a substantial severance pay. This 
finding is in line with Hypothesis 3. Obviously, stronger unions lead to stricter employment 
protection at the national or the firm level, protect long-tenured and older employees against 
dismissals and, thus, constitute an obstacle to employers’ lay-off policy. In other words, 
strong unions increase employers’ costs of choosing ‘dismissals’ as rejuvenation policy, 
making them offer severance pays to induce voluntary early retirement of older workers. 
 
Similarly, higher replacement rates, the measure of generosity of the pension system, appear 
to trigger a higher likelihood of retiring with a substantial severance pay (models 2 to 7). This 
effect is largely robust to the inclusion or exclusion of other macroeconomic and institutional 
factors (models 4 to 7). Contradicting Hypothesis 1, a more generous pension system does not 
appear to lead to less early retirement with severance pay. Possibly, firm’s cost-benefit 
analysis may suggest that payment of a severance pay is the smaller costs as compared to 
trying to fire the older worker and then having to keep her anyway. From the worker’s 
perspective, severance pay should compensate for the (accumulated) financial loss through 
early retirement. Thus, this finding may support the general view that a more generous 
pension system works as a subsidy for the firm’s rejuvenation policy, lowering worker’s 
demand for severance pay, and thus making severance pays more financially feasible to the 
firm, and more likely.20 
 
On the other hand, a larger decrease in pension wealth accrual leads to a lower probability of 
retiring with a ‘golden handshake’. Models 3, 5, and 7 suggest that the higher the implicit tax 
on continuing work, the less likely it is that workers are offered a financial premium for their 
early, voluntary departure, rather increasing the probability of simply being made redundant. 
This finding is in support of Hypothesis 1. From a worker’s perspective, a larger decrease 
implies a less neutral pension system toward early retirement, implying higher opportunity 
costs of not ceasing work prematurely. From an employer’s view, increasing opportunity costs 
of continuing work makes it less necessary to provide financial incentives for voluntary early 
retirements and more likely that workers simply accept being ‘laid-off’.  
 
                                               
20
 This finding does not imply that the generosity of the pension system had no likelihood increasing effect on 
choosing a dismissal policy (Hypothesis 1). The estimate can also be interpreted that its increasing impact on 
choosing the severance pay is larger (in absolute terms) than its increasing effect on choosing dismissal policies. 
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Turning to the macroeconomic control, no significant relation between unemployment and the 
type of company-induced early retirement is observable (models 4 and 5).21 This result is 
perfectly in line with my research question that distinguishes between two types of producer-
induced early retirement options, rather than trying to analyze worker’s choice between early 
retirement, becoming unemployed, or continuing work. Focusing on worker’s choice between 
these two ways of retiring early only is, in a sense, conditional on the firm’s decision to 
rejuvenate and to eliminate the older workers from its workforce, which has been made at an 
earlier stage, and thus is not subject to my empirical analysis (see also the model discussion in 
4). For this reason, in this specific context the so-called ‘discouragement effect’ is absent, 
which is caused by worsening labor market and re-employment conditions (e.g. Blöndal and 
Scarpetta 1999, Walker 1985). 
 
 
Table 6: Institutional Determinants of Early Retirement with Severance Pay 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Unemployment rate    -0.048 -0.057   
    [1.19] [1.50]   
marginal effect    -0.008 -0.008   
Union density (percent) 0.061* 0.053 0.254*** 0.042 0.242***   
 [1.67] [1.39] [4.45] [1.03] [4.22]   
marginal effect 0.009 0.008 0.035 0.006 0.032   
Replacement rate  0.057*** 0.042** 0.044** 0.029 0.031** 0.019 
  [3.41] [2.56] [2.22] [1.55] [2.46] [1.34] 
marginal effect  0.008 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.002 
Decrease in wealth accrual   -1.177**  -1.106**  -1.058*** 
   [2.27]  [2.16]  [2.60] 
marginal effect   -0.162  -0.152  -0.152 
Person-specific factors yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1405 1341 1268 1341 1268 1367 1278 
Pseudo R2 0.2157 0.2229 0.2322 0.2236 0.2332 0.2271 0.2275 
Clusters 184 165 150 165 150 187 159 
Notes: Dependent variable: Probability of retiring early accompanied by a severance pay, as opposed to being 
simply laid off by the employer. Logit estimation with standard errors clustered at the country-year level. ‘*’, 
‘**’, ‘***’ denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. ‘Marginal effect’ denotes the 
marginal effect evaluated at the sample mean. Reference person is male, unmarried, with no completed primary 
school education, working in the private-sector, in a small firm (1 – 5 persons), with no supervisory power (0 
persons).  
 
For assessing the quantitative effects and relative importance of these institutional factors, 
marginal effects have been calculated. They indicate the change in percentage points that the 
                                               
21
 Significance of the unemployment rate is only observed when pension system characteristics are excluded 
from the model, which suggests that they are designed in response to the general macroeconomic condition. 
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event ‘early retirement with severance pay’ takes place for a one-unit increase in the variable 
of interest. Taking model 3 as fully specified model (which lacks any bias caused by omitted 
institutional variables) the largest effect is observable for the implicit tax on continuing work 
(-0.162), followed by union density (0.035), and then by the replacement rate (0.006), the 
measure of pension system generosity. An increase in union density by one percentage point 
increases the probability of retiring with a severance pay by 3.5 percentage points, while an 
equal-sized rise in the replacement rate increases the event probability by only roughly 0.5 
percentage points. In contrast, a one-percentage-point increase in the decrease of pension 
wealth accrual (measured in absolute terms) decreases the likelihood of retiring with a 
severance pay by 16.2 percentage points. Given the actual variation of decrease in pension 
wealth accrual from about 0 to only 8 in the sample, this marginal effect does not appear 
unrealistic. As model 5 shows, the inclusion of the (then insignificant) unemployment rate 
leaves the previously observed marginal effects largely unaffected.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In a world of increasing exposure to economic globalization, producers may have a strong 
economic incentive to induce masses of employees to withdraw prematurely in order to 
rejuvenate their work forces and to stay competitive. However, from a national perspective, 
the generation of such masses of early retirees may impose a threat to the stability of the 
social security systems, in particular, and social peace, in general. Firms that face the choice 
between laying-off workers, forcing them into early retirement, and, alternatively, offering a 
severance pay to make them retire voluntarily, may, with respect to their short-term profit 
maximization, prefer a simple cost-saving redundancy policy. But from a societal perspective, 
departures with severance pay may be preferred over simple dismissals as they ease worker’s 
financial loss and prevent ‘socialization’ of these losses through the welfare or pension 
systems – for, after all, relieving poverty among the elderly has to be borne by the (employed) 
taxpayers.  
 
For these reasons, it may be interesting for policy makers to know whether the pension system 
and the employment protection by strong unions have an influence on producer’s choice 
between these two alternative rejuvenation policies. This study provides the first cross-
country study on the institutional determinants of early retirement with severance pay as 
opposed to being laid off. This empirical analysis employs the SHARE 2005 data on about 
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10,000 pensioners, of which about 6,000 retired early from their last dependent employment. 
The information on their individual employment histories enables to identify institutional 
effects in a combined micro-macro panel from 1960 to 2004.   
 
This study uses measures of pension system and labor market characteristics that are rather 
crude insofar as they reflect general institutional characteristics rather than the specific 
personal circumstances of each retiree (e.g. an individual-specific replacement rate). 
Nevertheless, this analysis provides first interesting insights, calling for more research in this 
field. It shows that stronger unions and a more generous pension system (in terms of 
replacement rate) make it more likely that early retirement is induced by a severance pay. This 
finding is in line with the hypothesis that unions protect employment and prevent dismissals 
of older workers. This result also supports the view that generous pension systems subsidize 
firm’s rejuvenation policy, as it decreases the financial amount of necessary compensating 
severance pay. Finally, a larger ‘implicit tax on continuing work’ appears to lead to more 
workers having been simply laid-off. Possibly, such pension system punishes continuing work 
beyond the point of early retirement so harshly that it generates economic disincentives for 
workers to resist their redundancy anyway.  
 
Nowadays, in overaging Western countries we are all faced with future cuts in the public 
pension system payments, which lower the replacement rate by which the last gross wage is 
translated into pension benefit payments. Also, during the last years the forces of 
globalization have led to a decline in union density, and lowered employment protection of 
workers in regular employment (Dreher and Gaston 2007; Fischer and Somogyi 2009). A 
parallel development is that politicians plan to make the pension system more actuarially 
neutral in order to keep labor market participation of older workers high.  
According to my analysis, two of these developments - weaker unions and lower replacement 
rates - will increase the likelihood that firms use a simple ‘firing’ strategy to rejuvenate their 
work forces, while an actuarially more neutral system would have the opposite effect. It is 
possible that the general societal development, though, is rather to decrease replacement rates 
(through increasing legal retirement ages) than to make the pension system more neutral, 
which may be more difficult to find a majority for. The actual development over last years, 
but also the general evolution since the late 80ies lends support to the view that national 
pension systems have become less generous and employment protection has been lowered, 
while there is little evidence for pension systems having become more actuarially neutral.  
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A final assessment of these developments, however, can only be made when taking their total 
effect on the early retirement probability into account. Fischer and Sousa-Poza (2009a) have 
shown that a less generous system leads to a lower probability of early retirement, as opposed 
to continuing work. On the one hand, we are all faced with the societally positive effect of less 
pension system generosity that increases labor force participation rate of the older population 
and thus lowers the financial burden on the younger workers. On the other hand, less pension 
system generosity may lower welfare through more early retirements forced through 
dismissals rather than induced through severance pays, as this study suggests. Thus, less 
pension system generosity may generate permanent income losses for retirees and foster old-
age poverty. Weighting the positive against the negative effects, from a societal point of view 
the direction of the total welfare effect depends not only on the share of older workers in the 
population, but also on the shape of the welfare function, namely the weight by which 
different societal groups account for national well-being. It hinges on these assumptions 
whether it can be simply concluded that an increase in dismissals of older workers in the near 
future was only a relatively small negative side effect of necessary pension reforms our 
societies have to bear. Otherwise, counteracting reforms of labor market regulations need to 
be discussed.   
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Entitlement Ages for the Public Old-age Pension System 
 1961 1975 1995 2003 1961 1975 1995 2003 
 Male Female 
Country         
         
Austria 65 65 65 65 60 60 60 60 
Germany 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Sweden 67 67 65 65 67 67 65 65 
Netherlands 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Spain 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Italy 60 60 62 65 55 55 57 65 
France 65 65 60 60 65 65 60 60 
Denmark 67 67 67 65 67 67 67 65 
Greece 65 62 62 65 60 57 57 65 
Switzerland 65 65 65 65 63 62 62 63 
         
Source: Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999), Table III.1 Values of 2003 are taken from Duval (2003), 
Table 1.  
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Table A2: Definition of Person-specific Variables 
  
Early retirement 1 if retirement age is below the legal pension age, 0 otherwise 
Early retirement with severance pay 
1 if early retirement was linked to a financial bonus (severance 
pay), 0 if early retiree was dismissed 
female 1 if gender is female, 0 otherwise 
Married 
1 if person was married or with partner at the time of 
retirement, 0 other wise. Variable constructed using 
information of retirement year/current marital status, year of 
separation or death of partner 
No completed primary school Reference category 
Primary School 
1 if person attended an institution of primary education, 0 
otherwise 
Secondary I 
1 if person attended an institution of secondary I education, 0 
otherwise 
Secondary II 
1 if person attended an institution of secondary II education, 0 
otherwise 
Post Secondary 
1 if person attended an institution of post-secondary education, 
not leading to a tertiary degree, 0 otherwise 
Tertiary I or II 
1 if person attended an institution of tertiary I or II education, 0 
otherwise 
log(retirement age) 
Logarithm of age at retirement year. Retirement age is 
calculated as retirement year minus year of birth. 
Tenure (Years in last job) 
Number of years worked with the last employer before 
retirement 
Firm size 
Categorical variable, based on firm size information given by 
employees and civil servants.  
Firm size  1 – 5 Reference category 
Firm size  6 – 15 1 if firm size is between 6 persons and 15 persons, 0 otherwise 
Firm size 16 – 24 1 if firm size is between 16 and 24 persons, 0 otherwise 
Firm size 25 – 199 1 if firm size is between 25 and 199 persons, 0 otherwise 
Firm size 200 – 499 1 if firm size is between 200 and 499 persons, 0 otherwise 
Firm size > 500 1 if firm size is more than 500 persons, 0 otherwise 
Supervision 
Categorical variable, based on information of the number of 
supervisees in the last job.   
Supervision 0 Reference category 
Supervision 1 – 5 persons 
1 if persons had managerial power over 1 to 5 persons in her 
last job, 0 otherwise 
Supervision 6 – 15 persons 
1 if persons has managerial power over 6 to 15 persons in her 
last job, 0 otherwise 
Supervision 16 – 24 persons 
1 if persons has managerial power over 16 to 24 persons in her 
last job, 0 otherwise 
Supervision 25 – 199 persons 
1 if persons has managerial power over 25 to 199 persons in 
her last job, 0 otherwise 
Supervision > 200 persons 
1 if persons has managerial power over 200 persons in her last 
job, 0 otherwise 
Private industry 
1 if person was employed in the private industry, 0 otherwise. 
Reference category 
Civil servant 1 if persons was a civil servant in her last job, 0 otherwise 
State industry 
1 if person was employed in the state industry in her last job, 0 
otherwise 
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Table A3: Definition of Macro Variables 
Average replacement rate 
Expected gross replacement rate (over next 5 years) at age 60 
in regular old-age pension system, averaged across six 
different life situations (3 earnings levels - 60%, 100% and 
140% of average earnings - and 2 marital status - single or 
married with dependent spouse of same age ). For most 
countries, values from 1990 – 1999 and 2003 are available, for 
some even earlier time series starting in the late sixties. Values 
for 2004 have been replaced by values of 2003. From 2000 to 
2002 and else were feasible missing values in all countries 
replaces by linear interpolation. Data made available by 
courtesy of Mr. Duval, OECD. For Denmark and Greece this 
information was not available. 
Decrease in wealth accrual 
Cumulated pension wealth accruals for singles on average 
wages, 1967 and 1995, (Table III.6, Blöndal and Scarpetta, 
1999, p.65.) in year of retirement, for postponing retirement 
from 55 to 65 years of age. For Greece (both years) and for 
Spain (1967) this information was not available. Between 1967 
and 1995, missing values have been replaced by linear 
interpolation. From 1995 on, values of the year 1995 have 
been used. 
Unemployment rate 
Unemployment rates from the OECD, gaps filled with WDI 
data. For Austria and the Netherlands time series data are 
largely replaced with WDI to ensure data comparability 
(Austria) and the greatest possible time series (Greece, 
Netherlands). Also use of non-standardized rates to ensure 
maximum length of time series. Some gaps, have been filled 
with linearly interpolated data, where not other data sources 
were available, particularly for Spain between values in the 
mid-sixties and first measurements in the early seventies. For 
many countries, data before the 80ies or even nineties were not 
available. 
 
Union Density 
Union density is defined as the percentage of union members 
in the national labor force (in percentage). Obtained from 
chapter 3 of the Economic Outlook 2004 (OECD 2004). 
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Table A4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
      
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
female 1440 0.31 0.46 0 1 
married 1440 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Log (retirement age) 1440 4.06 0.06 3.89 4.45 
Primary School 1439 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Secondary I 1439 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Secondary II 1439 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Post Secondary 1439 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Tertiary I or II 1439 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Tenure (years in last job) 1438 26.39 11.82 0 57 
Firm size  6 – 15 1440 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Firm size 16 – 24 1440 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Firm size 25 – 199 1440 0.32 0.46 0 1 
Firm size 200 – 499 1440 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Firm size > 500 1440 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Supervision 1 – 5 persons 1440 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Supervision 6 – 15 persons 1440 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Supervision 16 – 24 persons 1440 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Supervision 25 – 199 persons 1440 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Supervision > 200 persons 1440 0.02 0.15 0 1 
State industry 1440 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Civil servant 1440 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Unemployment rate 1436 8.22 4.46 0.43 24.12 
Union density 1408 36.34 23.67 7 80 
Replacement rate 1372 49.71 24.93 0 80 
Decrease in pension wealth accrual 1361 1.79 1.48 -0.22 7.90 
 
